The Revolutions of 1917 were mainly Bolshevik in nature and in leadership or were the Revolutions of 1917 mainly due to non-Bolshevik causes, the Bolsheviks merely hijacking the revolution at the last minute?  

    The popular myth that the Bolsheviks hijacked the revolution during the last minute suggests that the Bolsheviks provided little leadership and that it was mainly due to other causes. This view fails to acknowledge the fact that 'revolutions were often made by active minorities who tap groundswells of discontent.'
    This paper proposes to examine the nature of the 1917Revolutions, specifically the events leading to the October coup. First, the paper will look briefly at the events behind the February abdication. Second, it examines the relative weakness of the other parties and the Provisional Government. Next, Lenin's ideologies are shown to be the key in winning the support of masses. It then shows that the Bolsheviks polished up their skills in attempting coup both in July and finally in October. Finally, by looking at the actions taken by the Bolsheviks when they came into power, the paper will come to an adequate conclusion.

     The collapse of the Romanov Dynasty (1613-1917) might appear to be the result of WWI, but it was a catalyst to a process which for decades been sapping the old order.  Military defeats such as Crimean War (1853-6), Russo-Jap War (1904-5) and W.W.I damaged the reputation of the Tsar. In Russia, political legitimacy was not one of popularity nor morality, but invincibility and fear. Nicholas II processed none of the latter qualities.  Even with the removal of Rasputin, it proved to the masses that their miseries were tied up with the entire monarchical order. By 1916, with a defeated army, hungry cities and a stubborn Nicholas refusing to liberalise the regime, the answer was clear. The Tsar had to go.
    Contrary to popular beliefs, social revolution followed the act of abdication. Had Nicholas cared about only his own power and not the outcome of the war effort, the military unrest in Petrograd could be quelled with brutality characteristic of Lenin.  Unfortunately, Nicholas’s generals under the influence of the politicians in Petrograd wanted to stop the mutiny reaching the front-line. The Tsar abdicated for the sake of a military victory.  Once the mandate of the Tsar was no longer in existence, the peasants, workers and the soldiers revolted. In their eyes, it was not oppression of the Tsar that was the last straw, but the weakness of the monarchy. The subsequent coalitions of the Provisional government inspired no fear like that of Ivan IV, only Lenin matched up to the task.
     The February Revolution, started strangely enough by housewives on 23 February 1917 demonstrating under the banner of International Women’s Day. It quickly turned into a mob riot by 25 February. Orders from the Tsar to disband the Duma and suppressing the movement by Petrograd garrison were duly ignored.  When the Tsar was toppled, the left and the right were stupefied by this turn of events. Certainly, none thought that it would be so fast and easy for a perceived bread riot to turn into a genuine revolution.  Lenin himself was surprised by the fall of the tsar and he would not be back until 8 April 1917.
     Once the Tsar fell, the next question was: who would occupy the power vacuum? N. Berdyaev in 'The Origin of Russian Communism' maintained that “moderate people of liberal and humanist principles can never flourish in the elemental sweep of a revolution brought by war.”  Therefore, the primary events played out in the year of 1917 were the power struggles between the Provisional Government, the moderate Socialists and the Bolsheviks.

    The response of the masses signalled that the next government had to make the people identify with the government.  This was one of the main weakness of the Provisional government and the strength of the Bolsheviks. While the Bolsheviks would have their success attributed to fulfilling the needs the masses, evidences pointed otherwise.  Lenin saw the masses as a stepping stone for his craving for power. He wallowed himself among bourgeois intelligentsia and he never knew what the masses might do.  This was no Achilles’ heel as his game plan was power and the speed which he jumped at unexpected chances landed his Bolsheviks in power.  There was a distinct difference between doing what the masses want and handling out post-dated cheques. Lenin belonged to the latter.
    While the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ Deputies had the power, it was bound to lose out to Lenin who was even too impatient to be a true orthodox Marxist.   Mensheviks leaders of the Petrograd Executive Committee N.N. Sukhanov took the revolutionary political theory seriously. They believed that the power brought by the bourgeois revolution of February must not be toppled and the worker’s party should instead wait for the third stage of the revolution whereby they would then assume power.  On the other hand, the provisional Government was incapable of exercising real power and its very existence tenuous.  It pushed all important decisions such as land distribution to the formation of the Constituent Assembly. This in turn meant that decisions were temporary. Its numerous laws aimed at combating the excess of the Tsar rule were not replaced by new institutions. This laissez-faire political structure did not sit well with a country accustomed to centuries of autocracy.  Dual power was instrumental in creating an ineffective government.

     It would be useful now, to examine the ideologies behind the Bolsheviks or what Lenin believed in. Afterall, it was the nature of the Bolsheviks programme that won the support of  the urban population and garrisons and satisfied the peasantry.  In as early as 1902, Lenin (What Is To Be Done?) argued for a tight, hierarchically organised party composed of delicated people devoted totally to the proletarian revolution. This organisation was to be highly secretive and tightly organised. Consequently, democratic management of the party was impossible. This 'vanguard of the revolutionary forces' foreshadowed the course for an elitist and authoritarian government.  Next, he agreed with Sergey Nechayev that it was necessary for a violent revolution to be launched as soon as possible. The vanguard should not wait for the socio-economic conditions described by Marx and Engels.  By next year in the Second congress (RSDWP) in London, Lenin proposed close co-operation with the poor and landless peasants. He disagreed that these people should be classified as bourgeois. In a crisis, the land hungry, revolutionary by instinct and traditional peasants would side the workers. By contrast, Lenin's approach was so much closer to the native Russian mentality.
    Just as war toppled the Romanovs, it would be the death knell to the Provisional Government and the subsequent coalitions. In the first crisis, which lead to the resignations of Miliukov and Guchkov over the continuation of war, the liberals lost their last chance to maintain an independent lead in the government. The first new coalition (May 5th) signified a partial reversal of the Menshevik stand against taking power, which proved dangerous. In associating themselves more with the Provisional Government together with its unpopular and subsequent doomed Galician Offensive (18th June), they distanced themselves from the masses.
     The Bolsheviks were quick to exploit it. It was interesting to note that Lenin’s long term aims in April Theses (April 7) did not promise peace, but a civil war of classes to boot. The Bolsheviks wanted to use Russia as a base for world revolution and they were not too concern what happened to Russia.  Once again Lenin rejected the two stage revolution and insisted on immediate seziure of power by his party so as to implement his slogan 'Peace, Land and Bread.' The Bolsheviks should shed its old name and use 'Communist Party' instead.  His insistence at defying the Provisional Government helped him to circumvent the war issue. For most people, didn’t opposing the Provisional Government the same as ending the war? Its usefulness during April was not even apparent to his immediate Bolsheviks (Stalin & Kamenev) who were groaning at this stance.  To Lenin, war served its purpose in destabilising the government and if the new regime chose this line all the better.
     This uncompromising stance was adopted because Lenin believed that the proletariat was not revolutionary if left to its devices.  It fitted well together with mounting public impatience and a growing breakdown of reliance on law and government.  Lenin used flexible short term aims to avoid any rigid doctrinaire. He urged for the application of force at appropriate moments, compromising with the Left SRs if the situation demanded it and lastly maximum use of violence to undermine the government.  In view of this attractive flexibility, the people chose the spokesmen, Bolsheviks, through whom they could air their own solution which incidentally turned out to be Peace, Land, Bread.

     While it was clear that the Bolsheviks were not a majoritarian movement, but it did have important pockets of strength.  Just who and what were the nature of the masses that swelled the Bolsheviks’ ranks in 1917? They were the soldiers, workers and peasants. The urges of these three unprivileged groups could overthrow the government because it had nothing to loose. The masses had no stake in the government and the Bolsheviks seemed to promise a changed where they have everything to gain and nothing to lose.
    The isolated peasants knew no loyalty to any government. They were steeped in Muscovite culture and were estranged from the political establishment. Its tradition in communal landholdings and serfdom gave it little chance to acquired trappings of modern citizenship. To survive was to be crafty, it was a ‘everyone for himself ‘ world. Its lack of self-discipline invited despotism. They had no respect for private property and Lenin exploit this only revolutionary trait to help him turn the tables on status quo.
    The quiet in the country in the days of the February Revolution was at best temporary. Impatience overtook the peasants when the Provisional Government postponed the Land reform. In March, 183 disturbances and 49 cases of arson were reported in the ethically Russian provinces.  Lenin’s idea of land distribution was not alien to the Russian tradition of peasants commune as it was precisely what the peasants wanted. By promoting anti-war, Lenin effectively aligned the Bolsheviks with the peasants and the soldiers who were mostly peasants themselves. Kerensky’s attempts to procured gain only served to disintegrate whatever authority the Provisional Government had in the countryside.
     By May 1917, Bolsheviks had assumed a dominant position in the Petrograd factory communities. These workers were only superficially urbanised. They believed that if their village relatives were entitled to land, they too were entitled to the factory.  The workers pictured the future as being masters of their own plants. The factory committee was an expression of this syndicalism. Marxists wanted to put economy power in the socialist state not in the workers.  But the Bolsheviks did not discourage this deviation. The Bolsheviks were realists and Lenin called for ‘workers’ control.  They were not about to alienate strong support among the factory communities.   Hence, they could substantiate the claim  'party of the proletariat'.
     Kerensky’s war effort and the socialists’ support for it was profound betrayal in the eyes of troops. They wanted a soviet-based government that would stop the war.  From mid summer, anti war soldiers identified themselves as Bolsheviks even without formal membership. Reading their demands in print in the Bolsheviks Pravda convinced many that the Bolsheviks could be an effective mouthpiece for them. Small wonder that Bolsheviks’ strongest support came from the barracks.  For example,The Baltic Fleet (63% at the Constituent Assembly), Western Front (67%) and the Northern Front (56%) were Bolshevik strongholds.

     On July 3 and 4, disorder and violence erupted. Lenin tried to use the mob, carefully controlled, to topple the Provisional Government.  Clearly a fiasco, however this spontaneous Petrograd quasi-insurrection showed that the Bolsheviks were gaining ground. It also showed that the Mensheviks and SR were impervious to Bolsheviks manipulation, thus they began to concentrate on the factory committee which they already had a sizeable following. Kerensky, displaying indecisiveness, arrested some Bolsheviks but lacked the ruthlessness or perhaps the power to suppress them outright. Although the central Bolshevik was shaken, but by mid-August the Bolsheviks had 200,000 members, compared with 80,000 in April.
    In many ways, the July days was a dress rehearsal for the October coup. The Control of the Workers’ Section was insufficient and it must create some military executive branch stuffed with Bolsheviks and seize control through military coup. Trotsky put this knowledge to good use.   Lenin would insist in the immediate future that only a small well armed and disciplined force was needed in the October coup.
    Like a child of destiny, the Bolsheviks were to recover from this debacle due to the Kornilov Affair.  Kerensky effectively bit off the only fist that was capable of smashing up the Bolsheviks.  Lenin realised how fatal Kerensky’s mistake was and the Bolsheviks responded accordingly. Behind the facade of this alleged right coup, it wrenched from the Soviet an official authorisation to form the Red Guards units and also formed a Committee for Struggle Against the Counter Revolution.  They maintained that they would only fight against Kornilov, not for Kerensky. Fortunately, as the situation turned out they were not required to put their bravado into action.
    The Petrograd Soviet was given little credit, as most of the organisation was at grassroots where Bolshevik's influence was the strongest. They were able to respond so readily because they were the only power at hand not sallied by any association with the right.  More importantly, these events intensified Lenin’s distrust of mass organisation and other parties.  The Bolsheviks would tried to stay close to, but not led or pushed by the masses.

    Lenin was never known for his foresight as mentioned earlier, but he was opportunist.  The Bolsheviks were the biggest winners and rode on a rising wave of mass discontent. The Petrograd Soviet approved a Bolshevik resolution for the first time on 13 September and again on the 18th . This was repeated in Moscow. Trotsky, released from jail on bail, was elected chairman when the moderate Executive committee resigned. Control of principal soviets gave the Bolsheviks a strategic base.  In the aftermath of the July days, Lenin dropped the slogan ‘All power To the Soviets', as his prospect in the soviets seemed poor. On 14 September, he issued the same slogan and a call for armed insurrection from his hiding place in Finland based on the majorities the Bolsheviks had in Petrograd and Moscow.
    Most Bolsheviks leaders seriously doubted Lenin.   After all, Lenin remained in hiding even when he returned from Finland, blasting the Central Committee with angry letters exhorting them to revolt.  There were good reasons why Lenin wanted immediate action. He was afraid that Kerensky’s Constituent Assemble on the 12th November would pre-empt the Bolsheviks’ power. It was no good revolting against a SR Government who had a majority in the countryside and the cities. The Bolsheviks only had strength in the urban areas. Hence, They must take power before the Assembly.
    Trotsky had mean while laid the foundations for Lenin’s coup. He created a Northern Regional Committee to convene a Soviet Congress on the 20th October. More delegates were invited if they happened to be from Bolsheviks’ strongholds and the city Kiev (anti-Bolshevik) itself was only allotted 5 seats, less then a small province. In face of this, Ispolkom feebly protested and postponed it to the 25th. It gave what the Bolsheviks wanted a gathering of Bolsheviks soviets under the banner of Second Congress of Soviets. The plan was to present the fait accompli  for the Congress to ratified.  Trotsky, still smarting from the mistakes from the July days, wanted now militant arm to complete the coup. He took over the Military Revolutionary Committee and posed it as a organ defending the Soviets. It even had a Left SR, P.E. Lazimir as the Chairman.  The façade was complete.
     However, this did not meant that the Bolsheviks had a tight highly organised machine built to Lenin’s bidding prior to the October coup. That was the Soviet’s version. The truth could hardly be further than that. Bolshevik’s central secretariat was a farce and decision making was democratic though most voted for Lenin’s decision anyway and party discipline was scanty. They were only well organised comparatively.  Lenin was right in insisting for a military coup as it involved smaller number of people. The key to the myth was the popularity of the Bolsheviks policies, which enabled Trotsky to overcome both the Ispolkom (Soviet Executive Committee) and proper Soviet military chain of command.

    Events between 24-25 October were much distorted by Soviet myth.  The coup was a relatively quiet, quick and bungled affair. The remaining troops guarding the Winter Palace had gone home for dinner after a long wait.  The Bolsheviks hardly seized power, it fell into their laps. Around 10,000 people would later claimed to have participated, but they had really came after the coup and most were after the Tsar’s Château d’Yquem 1847 from the Winter Palace’s cellars.
     Why was Lenin so anxious in presenting the fait accompli to the Soviet Congress? It was to provoke the Mensheviks and SRs to walk out of the Soviet.   It was the first step in uprooting all existing institutions to clear the ground for Bolsheviks dictatorship.  To top it off, the Bolsheviks on the 26th  announced the formation of a new Council of People’s Commissars with all Bolsheviks members, replacing the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, to the surprised Congress.  The fall of the Tsar had invited a surge of revolutionary wave, but a small group did the actual transfer of power.
    The workers who had not taken part in the coup, viewed the Revolution as the establishment of a government for the working people not of a party. On 29th , Vikzhel, leaders of the railway union, threatened the Bolsheviks for  inter- party talks. The relatively easy coup had turned into a battle of attrition for the Bolsheviks against the loyalist. Lenin relented under such circumstances, but he was to immediately throw out the talks when Kerensky’s offensive failed miserably.  There was never much chance of popular participatory in the new Soviet government given the lack of political consciousness in Russia, the traditions of the peasants and the nature of the Bolsheviks who promptly renege on all their promises.
 
    While the new freedom liberated the long-surpressed spontaneity of the people of Russia, it could not led to greatness in world politics. Lenin through various means began to suppress this spontaneity as it might even endanger himself.  Lenin was largely successful because he treated local and foreign politics as warfare. He did not bother to compel, he annihilated.
    He achieved this on two levels. One by centralising power in the Bolsheviks and wiping out opposition. On January 1918, Bolsheviks bayonets dispersed Russia first democratically elected parliament, the Constituent Assembly. Prior to this, he refused Bolsheviks Central Committee suggestion to form a coalition in November 1917 even when left-SR members resigned in protest of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (9March 1918).  It did not matter if the Bolsheviks had won less than 25% of the seats in that Assembly because they moved swiftly to institutionalise terror. Two, at the grass roots level, he encouraged local soviet power to take matters into their own hands. The peasants against the landed, the workers against the employers and the soldiers against the officers. ‘Lenin created a Revolution to establish a dictatorship.’
    The formation of All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka, 7 December 1917) and the Brest-Litovsk Treaty highlighted the direction Revolution was heading. The usage of abuse and repression to deal with political dissent and maintenance of power.   Cheka, formed under the auspices of Trotsky who believed, ‘we shall not entered into the kingdom of socialism in white gloves on a polished floor’, was in charge of counter-revolution and sabotage.  Under Felix Dzerzhinsky, Cheka had the strength of 250,000 full-time agents just under three years compared to the Tsar’s Okhrana (secret police) of 15,000. It executed 1,000 political offenders a month between 1918-19 and had a concentration camp running with in weeks.  After killing the Tsar and his family (July 1918) Lenin was to discard the concept of individual responsibility of actions. Cheka killed by a person’s class. The bourgeoisie by its existence was guilty of counter-revolution. The Nazis did not have a monopoly on genocide.
     When Lenin was wounded by a SR assassination on 30th August 1918. The Cheka moved swiftly and launched the Red Terror. While it might be politically encouraged, the Red Terror came from the masses. As Cheka was initially decentralised, it responded and capitalised on social pressures to rob and humiliate the privileged and to replace the unjust social order with a republic of equals. Most of the time Cheka agents were just to supervise the carnage. In Evpatoria (a Crimean coastal town), soldiers killed 800 officers and bourgeoisie residents under three days.
     While Lenin was prepared to use ‘application of force at appropriate moments', he was also prepared to cede territories to Germany if ‘signing the peace terms now’ can prevent ‘signing the death sentence of the Soviet Government three weeks later’.  No sacrifice was too big for him to make if it preserved his power.  Lenin was paranoid coward. This time, he shifted his whole government to Moscow, as he believed the Germans were going to topple him. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty was the biggest land cedes given by the Russian government. Nevertheless, Lenin credited himself for prophetic vision by conveniently renouncing the treaty when the Allies won on 11 November 1918.

     In conclusion, the nature the revolution of 1917 was in every way Bolshevik in nature. From the onset, Lenin had already identified his party as the ' vanguard of the revolution'. Its nature was clearly demarcated by the refusal to believe in two-stage revolution and the incorporation of the peasants into their support base. Its subsequent actions reflected this ideology.  Although there were non-Bolshevik causes such as war and the failure of the Provisional government, one can see that the other parties were reluctant to assume power. It was left to the Bolsheviks with the gall and a clear ideology to take the wheels of the revolution.
     Another important myth was that the Bolsheviks' victory were seen as 'freak', but from the 'Kornilov Affair' one can see that Bolsheviks provided ample radical leadership and therefore had popular support. By the time of the October coup, the Bolsheviks had learnt from their mistakes and staged a successful quiet coup. The Bolsheviks had schemed all the way from staging the bogus Soviet Congress on the 20th October to the dissolving of the Constituent Assembly. From the moment, it came into power, it effectively consolidated power and such actions were indications of a determined party that would stop at nothing to determine the destiny of Russia.

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