Just how far-reaching was Malay Resistence to British Colonization in Malaya? Critically evaluate for the Period 1891-1928?

While it is common place to list the notorious murder of the British Resident in Perak, J. W. W. Birch (1875) as an example of Malay Resistance, such isolated incidents highlighted the anomaly of the term "Resistance." If one defines "Resistance" as a protracted guerrilla movement so evident in the 1940s, then the term would hardly be appropriate. J. De V. Allen in his 1968 article "The Kelantan Rising of 1915" elucidates the contradictions of Malay Resistance,

Indeed, the Malay community before 1941 is generally characterized as without reservation wholly loyal to Britain and quite disinterested in the politics of independence; this in spite of the fact that Britain never in fact enjoyed twenty-five consecutive years of peaceful rule unchallenged by a Malay resistance movement of the some kind.

Alternatively, one could divide Malay Resistance into "Overt Resistance" and "Covert Resistance." The former implies open rebellions led by the Malay élites in a direct collision course with the British Colonization. Although such rebellions had its roots in peasantry concerns, the movements were often manipulated for other ends. On the other hand, "Covert Resistance" does not suggest an OSS type of cloak and dagger resistance movements, rather it follows James Scott’s model of quotidian resistance, which "represent a form of individual self-help; and they usually avoid any direct symbolic confrontation with authority or with elite norms."

This paper will argue that such a model facilitates an intelligent inquiry on the dichotomy of the Malay Resistance: its covert persistency in almost every state versus its seemingly lackluster overt development. The key to this phenomena within the two modes of "Malay Resistance," for the period 1891-1928, stemmed from the peasants’ desire for "moral entitlements." Indeed, this very factor partly contributed to the retardation of the any forms of "Open Resistance" which paradoxically led to the relative stability of British Colonization in Malaya. Yet under this façade, covert Malay resistance effectively thwarted the penetration of British administration and indirectly alleviated peasantry hardship.

Overt Resistance

In the aftermath of Birch’s murder, British’s forward movement, although underwent a slight hiatus, was unabated in ambition. Indeed, Frank Swettenham believed that the severe punishments could be useful lessons. "The State of Perak," Swettenham rationalized, "gained in twelve months what ten years of ‘advice’ could hardly have achieved." Sultan Abdullah’s exile was a sobering lesson to any Malay elite chaffing under the Residential system. Barbara and Leonard Andaya believed, "the British power to punish even the highest-born coupled with the knowledge that open resistance had little hope of success goes a long way explaining Malay acquiescence in later years."

As a rule, such statements do explain the general flow of British Colonization in Malaya. But there were at least three uprising for the period 1891-1928 that seemed to defy any sweeping generalization. Elements that prompted the Birch debacle, such as the infringement of Malay values, tradition and the chief’s taxing rights, seemed to be again operative in the latter rebellions. It might seemed that the supposedly "lessons" of Birch’s murder did not stick.

For example, in the Pahang Rising of 1891-1895, the chief perpetuator, Dato Bahaman’s grievances originated from the loss of his income and privileges in the aftermath of British mining regulations. Similarly, members of the Pahang cabal, such as To’ Raja, To’ Gajah, Panglima Muda and Mat Kilau had similar grievances. This state of affairs had its antecedent in 1889 where one Haji Wan Daud ran amok in Kuala Lipis killing W. C. Mitchell the Superintendent of Ulu Pahang who had tried to evict the former. Clearly, the British interference in the form of district offices and State Council precipitated the magnitude of the subsequent Pahang Rising.

In Kelantan, the To’ Janggut Rebellion of 1915 had similar origins. Following the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, Britain obtained from Siam the suzerainties of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis in exchange for a loan of four million pounds to extend Siam’s railway to the Northern Malay States. Realpolitik aside, Kelantan found herself beholden to administrative reforms she neither like nor welcomed. Again, the District Officers replaced the territorial chiefs in collecting taxes, which were being channeled into the state treasury. Not only were the territorial chiefs removed from a source of pride and lucrative income, the peasants were faced with an faceless taxation system which took no account of the prevailing ground conditions. Engku Besar, the chief of Pasir Puteh, apparently felt the pinch and instigated his follower, To’ Janggut (Haji Mat Hassan) into rebellion.

Similarly, British rationalization of Trengganu’s administration hurt the peripheral elites’ authority. But Ulu Trengganu’s peasantry was worse off under the 1921 new land regulation. Impoverished peasants were not allowed to clear the forest to plant hill rice. The 1926 Land Enactment Act worsen the situation, now the peasants had to purchase permits for land clearing and even firewood could not be gathered at will. This "closing of the frontier" exacerbated the peasant’s hardship. A freak flood, Bah Besar, which devastated villages in December 1926, was the spark in such a tinder-like situation. That a Telemong religious recluse, Khatib Abdul Rahman, who had the backing of Ulu Trengannu’s local elites, could led a protest march towards Kuala Trengganu in May 1928 could only be attributed to the "culmination of tension" for the past six years.

In each of the three cases, the local élites provided leadership. Scott, however, perceptively alludes to the size of the movements, which varies directly with the kind of leaders throw up by the rebellion. Such chieftains materialized "as leaders by virtue of the respect and esteem others held for them and perhaps because of other attributes such as being the head of a large local kindred." Dato Bahaman had orang asli’s support, which largely accounted for his ability to evade capture. The Ulu Trengganu peasants’ grievances featured large in Khatib Abdul Rahman’s rebellion. All three rebellions had peasantry support.

Nevertheless, Harry J. Benda suggests that the majority of peasant’s resistance stemmed not as a reaction to Western colonial rule per se. Resistance was really "a revolution of rising irritations -- an age-old protest against outside interference, now recast in a new colonial -- and hence often foreign setting." In other words, Malay peasants, whose existence was already "perilously close to the subsistence minimum," would respond readily to any threats to their livelihood. Any reactions, according to James C. Scott, on the Malay peasants’ part were essentially efforts to restore the status quo of their "moral economy."

The era of the British Colonization heralded a rationalization of British administration, which meant an incremental closing of "space" for a Malay peasant. Hitherto, peasants could depend on the forces of village "validation" on a village leader to temper any excessive taxation. With the penetration of the district officers who were "the creatures of the center" than the locality, the situation changed. "Oppressed villagers realized that they," Shaharil Talib noted, "simply could not win or do anything about the situation short of open rebellion manifested their opposition in a variety of ways."

The corollary was that the resistance’s impetus offered by the Malay peasants were limited and localized. A restoration of their "moral entitlements" was at once explosive and ironically restrictive in scope and duration. The peasantry understood the futility of a prolonged rebellion--loss of livestock, homes and crops. Such reactionary concerns, to borrow from Marx, the inherent "lumpen[ness]" imply that the peasantry resistance impetus might be run out of steam if not effectively directed. With the direction of the resistance determined by the élites, it seemed that the longevity of the resistance depended very much on the acquiescence of the Sultan himself and the extend the peasants were willing to fight for their "moral entitlements."

Scott and Brenda’s insights clearly show the negative implications of Malay resistance rooted in peasantry concerns. For the three rebellions, effective leadership was non-existence in the long run. In the case of the Pahang uprising, the élites were not necessarily concerned with the plight of the peasants. Dato Bahaman’s intransigence was actually part of Sultan Ahmad’s move to resist British’s encroachment upon his royal prerogatives. Small wonder, the rebellion dissipated in 1895 in a spade of betrayals by the natives whose interests were threatened by the prolongation of the conflict. Sultan Ahmad, least he be disposed by the British, became worried and withdrew support.

Along the same vein, Trengganu’s recently installed Sultan Suleiman had no stomach to offer the British any resistance. He left most of the tedious administrative matters to Datuk Amar who was safely considered by the British as the "old gang." The British’s trust were well placed as Datuk Amar was solely concerned with the preservation of the old elite. In both rebellions, the peasants initially warmly supported the rebels, but were not enthusiastic about extending further support.

The narrow reactionary base of consensus, which fuelled the Kelantan Rebellion, was even more evident. To’ Janggut modestly declared that his aim was "to drive out all Europeans and all foreigners of every nationality, to establish the old regime and …to have taxes only once every three years." Obviously, Kelantan’s Sultan Zainal Abidin did not share this enthusiasm in face of "230 British soldiers and a lot of Malays with two machine guns" which had arrived 5 May with the warship Cadmus. As an ex post facto deliberation, the Sultan shrewdly requested for more British officers. When To’ Janggut was shot dead, the movement died with him. Allen perceptively noted,

If the rakyat of Kelantan and Trengganu were prepared to rebel against British Rule without the sanction of the aristocracies of their respective States, then the aristocracies were faced with the choice of joining them or relying more heavily than hitherto on British support, whether they like it or not, to remove rakyat grievances.

Peasant’s grievances did fuel the three rebellions, accounting for the retinue, which the local élites were able to command at the beginning. The root of this peasantry rebelliousness--the search for "Moral entitlement"--however, partly precluded the extent it would develop. Like the Samin Movement in the Blora district of Central Java, Malaya’s three resistance movements never went beyond the vision of a "reintegration of the primordial village society." Of course, Sultan Zainal Abidin, Sultan Suleiman and Sultan Ahmad did not find it convenient to allow a development of the resistance. The British already guaranteed their positions. The tragedy of Southeast Asian peasants was not so much the limitations of their rural protest, but "all too frequently the peasantry finds itself in the ironic position of having helped to power a ruling group whose plans …are very much at odds with the goals for which peasants had imagined they were fighting." In any case, the British imposition of a more rigid government framework limited the central élites’ freedom, but it gave sanctuary to those who were already at the apex of political life, for their office were no longer held at the whim of the sultan.

Covert Resistance

If the underlying impetus for Malay resistance--in the form of open rebellions--in British Malaya at the turn of the twentieth century was peasant unrest, then it is only logical to examine other salient forms of peasant protest. To push further the argument for the importance of peasantry concerns, Michael Adas’s argument for a "peasant [who] preferred a wide variety of alternative modes of protest that minimized direct confrontations with those viewed as oppressors" seems apt. Scott further argues that non-confrontational resistance was "well adapted to the particular characteristic of the peasantry." Lacking in leadership and discipline, everyday weapons such as "footdragging, dissimulation, false-compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage" did not require extensive planning. Indeed, spontaneous peasantry expression of "self-help" might have a bigger impact as a form of resistance against British Colonization.

One effective form of covert resistance was squatting. By illegally clearing plots of land without registering with the land office, the peasant capitalized on the fact that "once he had cleared and cultivated an unoccupied plot of ‘state land,’ he would have know that it was difficult for the administration to evict him; eviction was only possible through recourse to a law court." Difficulties in evicting the errant peasant was compounded by the fact that the power to enforce strict adherence to the law was precluded by the size of the administrative machinery. In 1915, there were only an absurdly low ratio of 236 Malayan Civil Service officers to a population of 1, 900, 000 in the FMS and UFMS. It was only a matter of time that the land courts were mired in a morass of false application of Temporary Occupation License, litigation and fake evidences. One colonial state forest officer bemoaned his task as formidable. By 1921, there were an incredible 415, 799 acres of peasantry rubber "small holdings"--consisting 33.4% of the total planted rubber acreage--despite the enactment of the 1913 Malay Reservations Act to restrict Malays to rice cultivation.

Law and order under British Colonization, was also another element of antagonism for the Malay peasantry. The police force, the most visible representation of British authority was looked down upon. In Pahang, Hugh Clifford reported, "The Malays loathe and detest men of their own race who flock into a newly protected state at the heels of their white masters." Sultan Ahmad was strongly opposed to having Sikhs in the police force. It was for a good reason: the Sikhs’ loyalty did not lie with the Sultan, but rather with the British administrators.

The peasants also adopted an equivocal attitude towards crime. Since it was British law and justice, it was regarded as alien to the Malay peasants. Any crime committed was not so much regarded as law-breaking, but a matter of bad luck for the culprit for being caught. "[The criminal] regards the time spend in captivity," Clifford further recorded, "as a payment exacted for the sin of discovery." Especially when the penetration of British administration vis-à-vis land rents was causing additional hardship for the peasants. Pilferage in times of economic strain was "not considered immoral. It is a far greater wrong that some should go short when other have abundance."

Another especially salient form of "self-help" were documented by Cheah Boon Kheng in his study of social conditions in Northern Kedah. In times of off-season of rice cultivation or drought, many Kedah peasants engaged in "Seasonal crimes" to alleviate themselves from hunger. Their victims belonged to the propertied classes such as the Malay landlords, Europeans, penghulus, Chinese shopkeepers. Its prevalence was reflected in the writings of George Maxwell, the first British Advisor in Kedah: "These convicts, all of them Malays…were padi planters, and in the unirrigated padi fields, there is no work for anyone for five months in the year…they were so prevalent as to be worse than a nuisance to the peace of the countryside."

When such "self-help" aggressively extended beyond the usual duration and evolved into a coordinate banditry, another potent form of social protest emerged: social banditry. E. J. Hobsbawm gives a Marxist interpretation,

However, when such communities, especially those familiar with feuding and raiding such as hunter and pastoralist, develop their own systems of class differentiation, or when are absorbed into larger economies resting on class conflict, they may supply a disproportionately large number of social bandits . . . [on the other hand] modern agrarian systems, both capitalist and post-capitalist, are no longer those of traditional peasant society and cease to produce social bandits.

This kind of transitory period, "a reflection of similar situations within peasant societies," is usually laden with economic crisis, which severely affected the peasant’s condition. Coupled with the momentary waning of the state administration efficiency and a lack of good communication to the periphery, banditry flourished. But the distinguishing feature of social banditry is its symbolic meaning: an individual peasant who refuses to submit to dire straits. Thus, it is "a form of self-help to escape it in particular circumstances." Hobsbawm’s argument for peasant banditry as a salient form of "self-help" coincides with Scott’s "moral economy" argument on a vital point: "Peasants, whose subsistence formulas are disintegrating due to climate, land shortage, or rising rents do what they can to stay afloat--this may mean switching to cash crops, taking on new debts and planting risky miracle rice, or it may mean banditry."

Hobsbawm’s conception of social banditry, however, is problematic in certain areas. One, a Marxist view does suggest certain inevitability in banditry’s form and substance. Where Marx envisages an inevitable transition of a capitalist society to a socialist one, Hobsbawm creatively transplants banditry into the transient feudal stage of the society before its progression into a modern capitalist stage. Thus, social banditry, "a rather primitive form of organized social protest," becomes seemingly the predecessors of proletariat unrest. Lest the general reader accepts uncritically this role of a social bandit, Hobsbawm quickly disabuses us of that notion. "The tragedy of the social bandit," writes Hobsbawm, "though a protest, is a modest and unrevolutionary protest…The bandit’s practical function is at best to impose certain limits to traditional oppression in a traditional society." Such a Marxist argument, of course, neatly underscores the importance of the proletariat’s vanguard role, as opposed to the bandits’ reactionary role, in the higher stage of historical materialism.

Two, Hobsbawm uses extensively peasantry perceptions of banditry as a construction of social banditry. "We have so far looked at the reality of social bandits," Hobsbawm states in a remarkable statement, "and at their legend or myth chiefly as a source of information about that reality, or about the social roles bandits are supposed to play…" Brent D. Shaw rightly questions such a methodology, " An obvious danger with this approach is that perceptions, like ideologies, can be deceptive; even oppressed peasants can be mistaken as to who is actually beneficial or destructive of their interests…which set of mental images is the historian to take as coherent with the realities of social exploitation?" Obviously, Shaw’s criticism was intended as a simultaneous swipe at Hobsbawm’s Marxist construct of social banditry and at the historical reality of banditry. Indeed, Hobsbawm latter admits that the latter was a valid criticism, "My discussion fails to distinguish clearly between the versions of the "myth" which are held about bandits who are personally known to those who hold it, and versions held by those at a more or less great distance in time."

Three, although Hobsbawm admits that there are "landlords bandits," he insists that "only the peasant bandits receive the tribute of ballads and anecdotes." But, Anton Blok critically points out that unfortunately most bandits were "anti-peasant." Ultimately, Hobsbawm "overemphasizes the element of social protest and obscures the significance of the links which bandits maintain with established powerholders." Blok thus, dismisses "social bandit" as a "construct, stereotype, or figment of human imagination." Unfretted, Hobsbawm blandly sloughs off criticisms in a new preface to the 1972 edition of Bandits, "However, there seems to me to be sufficient evidence for genuine Robin Hood behaviour by at least some bandits…I have not claimed that ‘noble bandits’ are common." Hobsbawm further stresses an important point, "What turns them into champions of peasant discontent is the role which peasant society ascribes to them, together with the arms and independence which enable them to play it," i.e. peasantry’s perceptions are more important than the reality of the bandit’s actions.

The controversy over "Social banditry," underscores the dangers of uncritical application in the area of covert Malay resistance. Yet, Scott and Hobsbawm’s construction of the social circumstances, which led to social banditry, bears reconsideration. Kedah in 1906, for example, faced fiscal difficulties, exacerbated by a debasement of the currency, had to reluctantly accept a British "financial advisor" in exchange for a loan to forestall the impending bankruptcy. This internal shakeup hasten a rationalization of Kedah’s administration vis-à-vis taxation. More importantly, the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty aggravated the turmoil at the top where Kedah was "bought and sold like a buffalo." The British innovations such as Land Tax, Land Rents and Forestry Laws which had led to open rebellions in Kelantan, Trengannu and Pahang, also diminished Kedah’s peasantry’s "moral entitlements." All the classical conditions were available in rural Kedah for social banditry; the burgeoning process of state integration to avoid political chaos, the transition towards market cultivation and economic poverty.

Here again, the basic ingredient for resistance--social banditry--to British Colonization was peasantry grievances. At least one bandit, documented by Cheah, did seem to conform to Hobsbawm’s "champions of peasant discontent." Salleh Tui (d.1909) for instance, was perceived as a social bandit by the minority ethnic Sam-Sam villagers of Kampung Tolak. "Because of his generosity to the people of the kampung to whom he gave plenty of money," Tunku Abdul Rahman reminisced, "he became very popular with kampung folk. What he did elsewhere was none of their concern. To them he was a leader whose exploits were a source of pride." Despite his generosity, Salleh Tui established a grim reputation for terror and violence, echoing Hobsbawm’s formulae of an "The Avengers" where "their appeal is not that of the agents of justice, but of men who prove that even the poor and weak can be terrible."

However, just as the local elite were able to hijack peasantry unrest to stage open rebellions, a similar situation replicates itself in banditry--in the form of "landlord’s bandits." The penghulus and the territorial chiefs of Kedah, after the British take over in 1909, lost their right rights to corvee . This involved a depreciation of their traditional influence over peasantry. Such a fluid situation opened windows of opportunity for emerging rival landed elites. One way for both the traditional élites and the new élites to enforce their right to a tradition patron-client relationship with the peasantry was to maintain retainers via bandits. Thus, local élites retained effective control despite the rationalization efforts of the British administration.

Bandit Nayan (d.1920) was one such cat’s paw for a Sulaiman Kerekau, the landlord of Guar Kepayang. The villagers apparently also perceived Nayan as a social bandit. One particularly harsh Penghulu, Nik Man bin Nik Haji Taha was shot by Nayan which enforced the local saying: only "the proud and mighty" feared Nayan. In fact, according to a quasi-historical novel by one Mansor Abdullah, the landlord Sulaiman enticed Nayan with a "moral" argument:

‘We need your help to seize back our rights,’ Sulaiman declared. ‘We’ll first ask them politely. We hope they will consider our plight. If they are stubborn, we’ll seize the lands; if they resist, we’ll kill them…’

The unfortunate penghulu was in reality harsh to Sulaiman who was heavily involved in illegal gambling dens, bullfights and cockfights. Nayan’s lesson had the immediate effect upon the penghulu, he never gave Sulaiman any trouble again. Hitherto, the police avoided Nayan as he was regarded as "Sulaiman’s man." But following a break with Sulaiman, over Nayan’s dalliance with one of Sulaiman’s wives, Nayan’s banditry days were over. As Sulaiman, himself was under heat from the British, decided to betray Nayan for a profitable end: the post of assistant penghulu.

Bandit Nayan, thus, was an interesting case that saddled both Hobsbawm’s ideal of a social bandit and Blok’s version of a Mafia-like ruffian who was a mere local élites’ instrument to suppress rivals and rebellious peasantry. Interestingly, sixty years after Nayan’s betrayal, certain lowly laborers still harbored the myth of Nayan. "He is still operating in the Yan area," Cheah was told, "I have heard of him. He helps the poor peasants."This dramatically underlines Hobsbawm’s crux of social banditry, "For the bandit’s defeat and death is the defeat of his people; and what is worse, of hope. Men can live without justice, and generally must, but they cannot live without hope." More importantly, the prevailing myth of Nayan, must have formed an indispensable ingredient for "a large variety of customs which precluded certain market outcomes in the interest of assuring the subsistence of the poor…[it] also represent prevailing norms about how the ‘honorable’ rich peasant or landowner ought to conduct himself vis-à-vis his poorer neighbors and kinsmen."

Conclusion

The main theme running through Malay Resistance was the importance of peasant’s search of his "moral entitlements" and the manifestations of the kinds of "self-help" available to a peasant. All these have the common aim of a modest alleviation of hardship. This accounted for the persistency of peasantry unrest. Nevertheless, the peasantry impetus for open rebellions either quickly faded due to lack of effective leadership or they were usually hijacked by the local élites for their own ends. In the long run, the peasants knew the futility of prolonged rebellion which ran counter to their limited desire for a "moral economy."

Far more significant, according to Nonini and Scott, was everyday resistance. Quiet yet spontaneous, such covert resistance such as illegal squatting, petty thefts and the nurturing of the concept of social banditry, effectively thwarted British efforts to restrict Malay peasants. Local élites also shrewdly utilized peasantry grievances via bandits to maintain ground control despite strong interference from the British. Ultimately, Hobsbawm’s concept of social banditry may represent both an ultimate mental escapade for the repressed peasant and a signal for the authorities to soberly reform their policies with an ear to ground conditions.

Bibliography

Adas, Michael. "From Avoidance to Confrontation: Peasant Protest in Precolonial and Colonial Southeast Asia," Comparative Studies in Society and History 23, no.2 (1981)

Allen, J. De V. "The Kelantan Rising of 1915: Some thoughts on the Concept of Resistance in British Malayan History," Journal of Southeast Asia History IX, no. 2 (1968)

_____. "The Elephant and the Mousedeer-A new Version: Anglo-Kedah Relations, 1905-1915," Journal of the Malaysia Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 41, pt. 1 (1968)

Andaya, Barbara and Leonard. A History of Malaysia (London: The Macmillan Press, 1982)

Benda, Harry J. "Peasant Movements in Colonial Southeast Asia," Asian Studies 3 (1965)

Blok, Anton. "The Peasant and the Brigand: Social banditry Reconsidered," Comparative Studies in Society and History 14 (1972)

_____. The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860-1960: A study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs (NY: Harper & Row, 1975)

Cheah, Boon Kheng, "Malay Politics and the Murder of JWW Birch, British Resident in Perak, in 1875: The Humiliation and revenge of Maharaja Lela," Journal of the Malaysia Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society LXXI, pt. 1 (1998)

_____. "Social Banditry and rural crime in North Kedah, 1909-1929," Journal of the Malaysia Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 54, pt. 2 (1981)

_____. "Hobsbawm’s Social banditry, Myth and historical Reality: A case in the Malaysia State of Kedah, 1915-1920," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 17, no. 4 (1985)

_____. The Peasant Robbers of Kedah, 1900-1929 (Oxford: OUP, 1988)

_____. "Patron-Client limitations of social Banditry: A case in Kedah, 1910-1920," in A Comparative Study of Peasant Unrest in Southeast Asia, ed. Leslie E. Banzon (S’pore: Southeast Asian Studies Program, 1991)

Gopinath, Aruna. Pahang: A Political History, 1880-1933 (KL: MBRAS, 1991)

_____. "Pahang Under the Resident System (1888-95): The initial Impact," Malaysia in History 23 (1980)

Gullick, J. M. Malay Society in the Late 19^th Century (Singapore : Oxford University Press, 1989 )

Hall, D.G.E. A History of South-East Asia 4^th ed.(London: MacMillan Press, 1981)

Hobsbawm, E. J. Primitive Rebels (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1959)

_____. Bandits (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972)

_____. "Social Bandits: Reply," Comparative Studies in Society and History 14 (1972)

Mahmood, Ibrahim Nik. "The To’ Janggut Rebellion," in Kelantan: Religion Society & Politics in a Malay State, ed. William R. Roff (KL: OUP, 1974)

Nonini, Donald M. British Colonial Rule and the Resistance of the Malay Peasantry (Conn.: Yale Univ., 1992)

James Scott & Ben Kerkvliet, "The Politics of Survival: Peasant Response to ‘Progress’ in Southeast Asia," Journal of Southeast Asia History 4, no.2 (1973)

Scott, James C. The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1976)

_____. "Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance," Journal of Peasant Studies 13, no. 2 (Jan 1986)

_____. "The Moral Economy as an Argument and as a Fight," Kajian Malaysia X, no.1 (June 1992)

Shaw, Brent D. "Bandits in the Roman Empire," Past and Present 105 (Nov. 1984)

Sutherland, Heather. "The Training of the Trengganu Elite," in Southeast Asia Transitions, ed. Ruth T. McVey (London: Yale Univ. Press, 1978)

Talib, Shaharil. "Peasant Anger Through the Ages: An East Coast Malayan/Malaysia Peninsular Experience," in A Comparative Study of Peasant Unrest in Southeast Asia, ed. Leslie E. Banzon (S’pore: Southeast Asian Studies Program, 1991)